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“Let us call [the bounded rationality] model of human choice the behavioral model, to contrast it 
with the Olympian model of SEU1 theory.  
  Within the behavioral model of human rationality, one doesn’t have to make choices that 
are infinitely deep in time, that encompass the whole range of human values, and in which each 
problem is interconnected with all the other problems in the world. 
…. 
  Rationality of the sort described by the behavioral model doesn’t optimize, of course. 
Nor does it even guarantee that our decisions will be consistent.” 
 
Simon (1983), pp. 19-23; italics added 
                                                           
 This is part of Selda Kao’s doctoral dissertation to be submitted to the School of Social Science and 
the Department of Economics, University of Trento, during this academic year. The thesis is being 
prepared under the supervision of Vela Velupillai and Stefano Zambelli. We are both indebted to V. 
Ragupathy for invaluable intellectual and logistical advice and support, although he is not responsible 
for any of the remaining infelicities. 
 





In  this  paper,  the  origins  and  development  of  behavioural  economics,  beginning  with  the 
pioneering works of Herbert Simon (1953) and Ward Edwards (1954), is traced, described and 
(critically)  discussed,  in  some  detail.  Two  kinds  of  behavioural  economics  –  classical  and 
modern – are attributed, respectively, to the two pioneers. The  mathematical foundations of 
classical behavioural economics is identified, largely, to be in the theory of computation and 
computational  complexity;  the  corresponding  mathematical  basis  for  modern  behavioural 
economics is, on the other hand, claimed to be a notion of subjective probability (at least at its 
origins in the works of Ward Edwards). The economic theories of behavior, challenging various 
aspects  of  ‘orthodox’  theory,  were  decisively  influenced  by  these  two  mathematical 
underpinnings of the two theories. 
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0. A Preamble 
Behavioural economics may have, finally, come of age
2. It is part of the curricula of graduate 
schools in economics, finance and management, often even one of the compulsory courses
3. 
More than a decade ago, in a letter to Velupillai (Simon, 2000; italics added), Herbert Simon 
was optimistic enough to state, after a half-a-century of tireless efforts to make behavioural 
economics a viable alternative to orthodox neoclassical economics, that: 
The economists here [at Carnegie Mellon University]  remain, for the most part, ..  
backward … , but I am encouraged by the great upswell, in the US and especially 
in Europe, of experimental economics and various forms of bounded rationality. I 
think the battle has been won, at least the first part, although it will take a couple 
of academic generations to clear the field and get some sensible textbooks written 
and the next generations trained. 
 
Yet, not much more than one year earlier, at the 84
th Dalhem Workshop on Bounded 
Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox
4 (Gigerenzer-Selten, p.ix), two distinguished 
economists claimed: 
“Bounded rationality needs to be, but it is not yet, understood.” 
 
How, one may legitimately ask, can a ‘battle [have] been won’, with a crucial concept lying at 
the foundation of its ‘armory’, ‘yet to be understood’? We believe there is a case for Gigerenzer 
and Selten to feel that the notion of bounded rationality remains to be clarified. This is because 
they have been meticulous in having dissected the way the notion has been (ill-) defined by 
varieties of orthodox theorists
5, including those we shall shortly identify as some of the pioneers 
of modern behavioural economics. Moreover, they have also understood, with impeccable 
perspicacity, that boundedly rational behavior has nothing to do with either optimization, or 
irrationality (ibid, p.4).  
                                                 
2 In the volume on Behavioural Economics, as part of the Routledge Major Works Series in New Trends and 
Frontiers in Economic Analysis, edited by Shu-Heng Chen and Vela Velupillai (2012), there are – at the moment – 
360 references in the five subject areas of Agent-Based Behavioural Economics, Behavioural Finance, Behavioural 
Game Theory, Behavioural Neuroeconomics and Modern Behavioural Economics. This list does not include the 
literature on Classical Behavioural Economics, which could easily add at least another 50 items to the list. By the 
way,  none of them make the distinction between classical and modern behavioural economics.  
3 This footnote added by Velupillai. As it is in our University’s graduate School of Social Science. It was once given 
by Velupillai, till his responsibility for the course on Behavioural Economics was abruptly terminated by the 
director and academic director of the previous incarnation of the graduate school, then called CIFREM. His course 
emphasized the distinction between classical and modern behavioural economics, emphasizing the underpinning of 
the former in a model of computation and the latter, at least in its origins, in subjective probability theory à la De 
Finetti-Savage. The current rendering of behavioural economics, as a graduate course, makes no such distinction 
between two kinds of behavioural economics. 
4 Held in Berlin on March 14-19, 1999. 
5 The two paradigmatic examples of this genre, representing ‘old neoclssical’ and newclassical economics, are, 
respectively Frank Hahn & Roy Radner, on the one hand, and Thomas Sargent, on the other (cf., Gigerenzer-Selten, 
p.5, Radner (1980),  Hahn (1985), pp. 15-16 and Sargent (1993), pp. 21-24. 4 
 
Where we differ with Gigerenzer and Selten is their anchoring of bounded rationality and 
satisficing in ‘fast and frugal stopping rules for search’ without, however, providing this anchors 
a solid foundation in itself. Bounded rationality and satisficing, in our framework, is a natural 
outcome of replacing optimization with decision problems (in its metamathematical senses), 
whereby problem solving, in general, and human problem solving in particular, lead to 
structured search in computationally complex spaces that are classified in terms of solvability, 
decidability and computability. Optimization becomes a very special case of the solvability of a 
decision problem, intrinsically coupled to algorithms, which are given measures of complexity 
that are capable of encapsulating the notions of ‘fast and frugal’ in precise ways. 
 
The rest of the paper is structures as follows. A broad brush discussion of the two kinds of 
behavioural economics is provided in the next section. Next, the analytical foundations of 
modern and classical behavioural economics is discussed and dissected in section 2. Section 3 is 
devoted to a discussion of the special role played by Herbert Simon in forging, ab initio, 
classical behavioural economics and its rich vein of characterizing subfields. The concluding 
section suggests ways of going forward with a research program in classical behavioural 
economics – eventually with the hope of exposing the lacunae in the foundations of modern 
behavioural economics, and its ad hockeries. 
   
1.   Emergence of Behavioural Economics 
 
Behavioral economics, which originated, almost fully developed, during the 1950s, can be 
classified into at least two streams - Classical and Modern. The former was pioneered by 
Herbert Simon and the latter by Ward Edwards, respectively. The two streams are clearly 
distinguishable on the basis of their methodological, epistemological and philosophical aspects. 
Despite having sharp contrasts in their approaches to understand human behavior, a clear 
distinction between them was not made until recently (Velupillai, 2010b). Behavioral economics, 
in general, challenges orthodox economic theory and its foundational assumptions regarding 
human behavior, its institutional underpinnings (especially in its Classical versions pioneered by 
Simon), its poor prediction power and its intrinsic non-falsifiability. 
 
The main distinctions of Modern Behavioral Economics (henceforth MBE) and Classical 
Behavioral Economics (henceforth CBE) can be classified into three aspects. First, MBE 
assumes economic agents are maximizing utility with respect to an underlying preference 5 
 
order – to which ‘an increasingly realistic psychological underpinning’ is attributed (Camerer, et. 
al., 2004, p. 3); CBE assumes no underlying preference order and an economic agent’s decision 
making behavior, at any level and against the backdrop of every kind of institutional setting, is 
subject to bounded rationality and exhibits satisficing behavior. Put another way, MBE remains 
within the orthodox framework of optimization under constraints; CBE is best understood in 
terms of decision problems (in the metamathematical sense, cf. Velupillai, 2010b). Second, 
MBE concerns the behavior of agents and institutions in or near equilibrium
6; CBE investigates 
disequilibrium or non-equilibrium phenomena.  Third, MBE accepts mathematical analysis of 
(uncountable) infinite events or iterations, infinite horizon optimization problems and 
probabilities defined over σ-algebras and arbitrary measure spaces
7; CBE only exemplifies cases 
which contain finitely large search spaces and constrained by finite-time horizons. The aim of 
this chapter is to introduce and elaborate the respective foundations of two streams in behavioral 
economics and their applications. Subsequently, the research ideas will concentrate on, and 
expand upon, some of Simon’s fundamental contributions to CBE, based on his explicit 
(computationally constrained cognitive) and implicit (computational complexity) foundations, 
always with a model of computation (usually the Turing Model of Computation) constraining 
and disciplining his research program. 
 
1.1  Modern Behavioural Economics 
 
1.1.1  Origins 
“The combination of subjective value or utility and objective probability characterizes 
the expected utility maximization model; Von Neumann & Morgenstern defended this 
model and, thus, made it important, but in 1954 it was already clear that it too does not 
fit the facts. Work since then has focussed on the model which asserts that people 
maximize the product of utility and subjective probability. I have named this the 
subjective expected utility maximization model (SEU model).” 
Ward Edwards, Behavioral Decision Theory,  Annual Review of Psychology, 1954, Vol. 
12, pp. 473-498. 
 
The origins of Modern Behavioral Economics are often claimed to have emanated from the 
early works by Richard Thaler, along with Kahnmann and Tversky, for example in the 
following quote: 
                                                 
6 The ‘near’ is defined, in all cases we are aware of, by uncomputable approximation processes of uncomputable 
equilibria. 
7 Despite ostensible reliance on the kind of subjective probability defined by De Finetti and Ramsey, both of whom 
eschewed even countable infinities. 6 
 
“Kahneman and Twersky provided the raw materials for much of behavioral economics – 
a new line of psychology, called behavioral decision research, that draws explicit 
contrasts between descriptively realistic accounts of judgement and choice and the 
assumptions and predictions of economics
8. Richard Thaler was the first economist to 
recognize the potential applications of this research to economics. His 1980 article 
“Toward a theory of consumer choice,” published in the first issue of the remarkably 
open-minded (for its time) Journal of Economic Behavioral and Organization, is 
considered by many to be the first genuine article in modern behavioral economics.”  
Camerer et al. (2004), pp. xxi-xxii. 
 
Contrary to these claims, the real origins of modern behavioral economics can be traced back to 
Ward Edwards, particularly to Edwards (1954) and Edwards (1961), which provide the 
methodological framework within which modern behavioral economics can be identified. 
Edwards, in turn, draws inspiration from the famous subjective probability theorist and 
statistician Leonard Savage.  The two papers summarize the emergence of core notions that 
characterize what may, with hindsight, be called a Neoclassical Theory of Behavioural 
Economics and offer detailed philosophical and methodological discussions related to them.  
More importantly, Edwards posed challenges to orthodox neoclassical notions, basing them on 
psychological and experimental evidences. It also introduces and provides a remarkable and 
detailed survey of the classic works in the field of behavioral economics till then
9. Other 
contributions of Edwards include the confirmation of intransitive behavior and introduction of 
experimental results and stochastic (transitivity) models of individual behavior. 
 
The most remarkable aspect of Edwards’ papers is the formalization of weighted values and the 
introduction of Subjective Expected Utility (Ramsey (1931); Savage (1954)). He also sheds light 
on the early studies on subjective probability that happened before and after Savage’s book in 
1954. The standard formulation of the objective function faced by a decision maker in an 
economic model under risk/uncertainty is presented as a linear combination of the values of 
outcomes and probabilities attached to each of these outcomes. The values of outcomes and 
probabilities, both, can be objective or subjective. The formulation of expected utility can be 
stated as: 
                                       i
n
i
i U p U E  
 1
) (  ,  
                                                 
8 As if these were not prime motivations for Simon when he launched his program of research on behavioural 
economics long before some of these authors were even born. It is just that Simon’s psychological and cognitive 
bases for modeling realistic economic behavior was always underpinned by a model of computation. 
9 So the claim that behavioral economics was not even a field till 1980 is highly questionable, even from the works 
by precursors to Kahneman, Tversky and Thaler. 
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where  i p  is the probability of ith outcome out of n possible ones and Ui  is the value of ith 
outcome. Based on this we can have the following classification: when subjective values are 
weighted with objective probabilities, it results in Expected Utility.  Instead, when subjective 
values are weighted with subjective probabilities, it becomes Subjective Expected Utility. the 
other two alternatives were considered to be unimportant or proved to be unrealistic in the 
literature. 
 
The classic Expected Utility formulation was first devised by von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
who explicitly invoked formal, ‘objective’ probability theory and were even prepared to use the 
frequency theory of probability
10 – explicitly and forcefully rejected by Savage, whose work 
was deeply influenced by De Finetti’s foundational work on subjective probability theory. Thus, 
the probability with which they axiomatized expected utility maximization is actually objective. 
Since then, it became clear that Expected Utility fails to explain and predict individual behavior 
under risk – let alone uncertainty (a distinction not carefully maintained by practitioners of 
MBE). For vN.-M., economic problems were not clearly formulated and, besides, the 
mathematical tools, they felt, were improperly used. They attempted to make the qualitative 
notion of utility and preference measurable just like, say, force in physics. The main argument 
was that, for economics to be a rigorous science, formalised mathematically, preferences should 
be measurable. Furthermore, for preferences to be measurable, they should be numerically 
definable and mutually comparable. Individuals are supposed to seek and be able to choose the 
outcome which will give them the highest satisfaction among all the possibilities. But neither the 
process that underpinned ‘seeking’, nor the process of ‘choosing’ were given any procedural 
content, unlike the way Simon, who from the outset sought to emphasise the search processes at 
the foundations of choice over a complex space of alternatives. 
 
There was a great deal of effort that was dedicated to measuring utilities and probabilities under 
the framework of subjective (personal) probability around the time of the early work of Ward 
Edwards.  This empirical work went hand-in-hand with the simultaneous formalization by 
Savage, who built his foundations of statistics on the basis of De Finetti’s theory of 
subjective probability. In this scheme, the assumptions of complete preference ordering and the 
sure-thing principle play a crucial role, and the individuals learn and adjust their prior beliefs 
with the occurrence of events according to the Bayes’s theorem.  These properties for 
                                                 
10 But not in its modern refounding and reformulation as algorithmic probability. 8 
 
subjective probabilities proposed by Savage, in turn, implies that individuals with different 
set of subjective probabilities, over the course of their experience, will end up having close 
subjective probabilities which coincide with each other.  
 
The critical point of rapid development of MBE can be attributed to the proposal of 
Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky in (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which was 
considered a satisfactory replacement of expected utility theory. The theory encapsulates the 
idea of subjective probability
11 (not directly) and loss aversion. Even today, loss aversion is still 
one of the most notable behavioral reasoning used to interpret and model decision making in 
different contexts. 
 
A series of “anomalies” - resulting from the violation of transitivity and other axioms, 
inconsistency of some principles of neoclassical economics - have been systematically collected 
and investigated by contemporary behavioral economists, notably, Richard Thaler, Colin 
Camerer, George Loewenstein, Matthew Rabin among many others, since the late 1980s in the  
Journal of Economics Perspectives. The inconsistency in behavior is mainly observed in 
experimental environments, and thus the neglect of psychological and social factors are 
proposed as possible causes for this, according to MBE. The Neoclassical agents are now like 
physically weakened patients unable to predict even reasonably well, who are being examined 
with the benchmark idealized case of orthodox theory and its strict rational, constrained 
optimization, behaviour and the modern behavioral economists are assuming the role of seeking 
and proposing the remedies for them.  The themes and fields challenged from which anomalies
12 
are found cover Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Finance Theory, Industrial Organization to 
Game Theory to Development Economics. This has led to a collectively divided field of 
behavioral economics, broadly, into (at least) Behavioural micro, Behavioural macro, 
Behavioural finance and Behavioural game theory. 
 
                                                 
11 But neither consistently, nor meaningfully. In the whole literature on MBE, all the way from the early works of 
Kahneman and Tversky, there is a remarkable confusion and conflation of a variety of theories of probability, even 
within one and the same framework of modelling rational, psychologically underpinned, individual behaviour in 
economic contexts. See, in particular, Amos Tversky: Elimination by Aspects – A Theory of Choice,  Psychological 
Review, Vol. 79, # 4, July (1972). 
12 Velupillai refers to this trait in MBE as anomaly mongering in his lectures on Behavioural Economics. His point 
is that both the Newclassicals, whose analogous notion is ‘puzzles’ – ‘equity premium puzzle’ being paradigmatic – 
and the Modern Behavioural Economists are consciously invoking Kuhn’s terminology and, therefore, suggesting 
that their program of research is leading to that much maligned concept of a ‘paradigm shift’. However, see below, 
under the subsection on Behavioural Finance. 9 
 
1.1.2  Fields of Modern Behavioural Economics 
 
Behavioural Microeconomics Some anomalies concerning preference and utility in decision 
making are studied. Preference reversal is believed to be a robust anomaly. This field of 
research attempts to challenge the commonly agreed notion in neoclassical theory that the values 
of goods or outcomes do exist, and people know these values directly, by highlighting the 
presence of framing effects, reference based effects etc. (Tversky and Thaler, 1990).  It is also 
suggested that the assumption of a stable preference ordering should be discarded.  The 
preference changes can be due to a variety of factors such as status quo, loss aversion, 
ambiguity aversion and endowment effects.  Their thesis is that a consideration of these factors 
can make the analysis of preference more manageable and tractable
13.  The general worry is 
that importing psychological inspirations into existing economic models may create new 
complexities and reduce their predictive power (Kahneman et al., 1991). Furthermore, the 
difficulty and infeasibility of utility maximization was pointed out, and economists sought for 
possible psychological and social causes as explanation for the “mistakes”
14 in decision making 
(Kahneman and Thaler, 2006). 
 
In MBE, the majority of research is focus on suggesting more ‘realistic’ utility functions and 
decision contexts of modeling.  There is a minority of research questioning the fundamental 
framework of preference, and maximization. Such as Slovic (1995) and modeling of 
satisficing.  For formalizing satisficing, heuristic searches
15 are applied. Heuristics serves a 
guide helping decision makers to find the short cuts for relevant information. Together with 
satisficing, decision makers are supposed to stop searching – i.e., an exogenously determined 
stopping rule for the search process is activated - whenever some (exogenously determined) 
criteria are achieved (e.g. aspiration level). However, they are not necessarily aware of 
computability or undecidability which is inherent in many such procedures. If the heuristic 
search is programmed as a finite automaton, it will naturally terminate at some point.  However, 
if it is programmed as a Turing Machine, then the decision maker is confronted with the famous 
result of the halting problem for Turing Machines. This means that the agent who is searching 
will either not be able determine whether the heuristic reached the exogenously determined 
aspiration level, or – even worse – whether it will ever do so within any reasonable, or even 
                                                 
13 Not formalized in terms of tractability in the formal hierarchy of degrees of computational complexity simply 
because these models are not underpinned by any formal model of computation. 
14 In other words, ‘Anomalies’! 
15 Without, however, any recognition that ‘heuristics’ are, formally, ‘algorithms’. 10 
 
unreasonable, exogenously given time span.  
 
Behavioural Macroeconomics Similar psychological and social reasons are also applied to 
interpret some Macroeconomic phenomena
16, such as, money illusion, rigidity of (nominal) 
wages (loss aversion and fairness) and involuntary unemployment (gift-changing equilibrium of 
reciprocal preference). The most far-reaching challenge might be to address the questionable idea 
of the traditional notion of  Discounted Utility. The presence of non-exponential discounting of 
utility was observed (Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989), and subsequently
17 more complex ways 
(hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic discounting etc.) of discounting were invented, which are 
believed to be more realistic and better able to provide  predictive models in the context of inter-
temporal choices. Other than time discounting, there is also research on behavioral lifecycle 
theories (e.g. mental accounting (Thaler, 1990)) on savings and marginal propensity to 
consume and on regret theory, such as using counterfactual, introspective thinking and self 
control of future misbehavior on consumption and saving. But in no such case have non-
traditional logics been utilized to derive counterfactual predictions based on introspective 
thinking.   
 
Behavioural Finance  Behavioral finance stands on the ground against the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and it is probably one of the most developed subfields in behavioral economics. In 
other words, it is commonly believed that the efficient market hypothesis has virtually died out. 
The well known anomalies in finance include the equity premium puzzle (high risk aversion), 
calendar effects, status quo effect, limits to arbitrage, social preference and other stylized facts 
(De Bondt and Thaler, 1989; Froot and Thaler, 1990; Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Lee et al., 1990; 
Siegel and Thaler, 1997; Thaler, 1987a,b). Due to the nature and functioning of financial 
markets, huge amount of data points, at high frequencies, are available. Therefore it is also a 
rich ground for behavioral and (so called) computational economists to investigate and validate 
their models. 
 
Behavioural Game Theory  Similar to the other fields, behavioral game theory investigates 
how the results regarding strategic interaction deviate from the orthodox game theoretic 
                                                 
16 Akerlof and Shiller (2009) categorizes five types of animal sprits (likely to be misnamed): they are confidence, 
fairness, corruption and antisocial behavior, money illusion and stories. 
17 Not quite ‘subsequently’, because the notion of hyperbolic discounting has been ‘around’ in intertemporal 
macroeconomic policy models at least since the early 1960s. But it is to the credit of the MBE’s practice and 
insistence that the traditional and almost routine recourse to exponential discounting in intertemporal optimization 
models is being challenged. 11 
 
predictions in the light of some behavioural assumptions regarding decision making in strategic 
situations.  The psychological and social explanations such as guilt aversion and fairness 
criteria are incorporated into the traditional models. Behavioral game theory benefits from the 
fact that most of these models can be tested in laboratory environments by collecting a sufficient 
number of subjects. Therefore, it coexists with experimental economics and neuroeconomics 
which will be introduced later.  A reasonably up to date survey of behavioral game theory can 
be found in Camerer (2003). 
 
1.1.3  Concluding Remarks 
 
Although Neoclassical Economic theories have been critically questioned by economists and 
psychologists for many decades, it is still explicitly specified that optimization, equilibrium and 
efficiency, on which Neoclassical economic – and its variants, such as Newclassical and New 
Keynesian - theories are based, is not completely rejected by behavioral economists (see, for 
example, the opening, programmatic, pages of Camerer and Loewenstein (2004)). The 
ultimate goal of behavioral economists seems to be to extend or replace neoclassical theories 
in a normative sense.  
 
Modern behavioral economists have, over the years, discovered and categorized different 
forms of deviations from consistent behavior.  A valid question here would be:  why do these 
anomalies arise and what are they anomalies with respect to? These discoveries such as 
reference dependence and loss aversion, preference over risky and uncertain outcomes and time 
discounting, came mostly from observations in experimental environments. The anomalies and 
puzzles that were discovered and discussed are departures with respect to the neoclassical 
normative benchmark for judging rational behavior, which is expected utility maximization.  
These evidences or anomalies are in turn used to formulate more realistic utility functions and 
further, these modified utility functions are incorporated into the existing models. In some sense, 
Modern behavioral economists modified fractured pieces in the foundations of Neoclassical 
theories, but still they worked within its basic premises (preferences, utility, equilibrium and 
maximization). 
 
Firstly, MBE preserves the doctrine of utility and does not go beyond it or discard it. Secondly, 
though the behavioral models do consider more realistic psychological or social effects, 
economic agents are still assumed to be optimizing agents whatever the objective functions 12 
 
may be.  In other words, MBE is, still, within the ambit of the neoclassical theories or it is in 
some sense only an extension of traditional theory by replacing and repairing the aspects which 
prove to be contradictory. These adjustments in turn are expected to enhance the predictive 
power of original theories. On the contrary, CBE does not try to endow the economic agent a 
preference order which can be represented by utility functions; nor, of course, do equilibria or 
optimization play any role in the activation of behavioural decision making by CBE agents. 
 
1.2  Classical Behavioural Economics 
 
It is interesting to note that even before the advent of behavioral economics, economics was 
still very much based on behavioral principles and psychology.  For example, Adam Smith 
and Keynes explicitly considered psychological factors in their theories. With the rise of 
neoclassical economics, nearly all psychological factors were removed from normative 
economic theories. The phrases distinguishing “Classical” from “Modern” behavioral 
economics come about, partly, also for chronological reasons. 
 
One of the most essential and concrete line separating MBE and CBE is that rational behavior 
is adaptive or procedural in the postulation of CBE; this makes rational behavior naturally 
algorithmic and the need to underpin it with a model of computation enters right on the ground 
floor of theory and its empirical counterparts. Given the nature of adaptive behavior and the 
complex environment in which it takes place, optimization principles and equilibrium analysis 
become meaningless and nearly infeasible. The resolving of these difficulties should not be to 
find approximations of sophisticated mathematical models using numerical techniques, like what 
we see in some parts of MBE.  
 
As far as dynamical rational behavior is concerned, where procedure is central, Simon, 
Richard Day, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter are considered as the pillars of CBE (V elupillai, 
2010b). The research line was motivated by the questions ‘How does the mind work?’; ‘What 
kind of Mechanisms should we postulate for the Mind, based on current knowledge and research 
on Cognitive Science, to make sense of observed behavior?’; ‘What postulates are useful to 
understand and predict behavior?’; ‘What metaphors are useful to formalize intelligent 
procedural behavior?’; ‘How do operational Institutions Emerge and Survive’?;  
 13 
 
Research surrounding these questions is intrinsically underpinned by cognitive psychology and 
the theory of computation. They lead also to what became the natural Simon framework of 
Human Problem Solving, of agents faced with complex and intractable search spaces, 
constrained by computationally underpinned cognitive processes facing time and resource 
constraints. A notable precursor for Simon, on these aspects, was Polya. 
 
Simon is best known by the felicitous phrase he coined, “bounded rationality”, which appeared 
in Simon (1957) for the very first time (although it had appeared in other forms already from his 
classic book on Adminstrative Behaviour (1947).  Bounded rationality generally refers to the 
internal cognitive limitations, and the constraints of the external environment which confront 
human minds in decision making contexts. This latter is more specifically contextualized by the 
Institutional backdrop for individual behavior. Therefore, in order to incorporate the notion of 
bounded rationality into the behavioral model more rigorously, one ought to investigate how 
human thinking is limited internally and how human beings adapt and interact with the 
environment, especially as members of an institution. 
 
Simon’s insight about modeling adaptive individuals in complex economic environments can be 
better understood in the fragment: 
 
“Suppose we were pouring some viscous liquid molasses into a bowl of very irregular 
shape.  ...  How much would we have to know about the properties of molasses to 
predict its behavior under the circumstances?  If the bowl were held motionless, and if 
we wanted only to predict behavior in equilibrium, we would have to know little, 
indeed, about molasses. The single essential assumption would be that the molasses, 
under the force of gravity, would minimize the height of its center of gravity.  With this 
assumption, which would apply as well to any other liquid, and a complete knowledge 
of the environment, in this case the shape of the bowl, the equilibrium is completely 
determined. Just so, the equilibrium behavior of a perfectly adapting organism depends 
only on its goal and its environment; it is otherwise completely independent of the 
internal properties of the organism.  
If the bowl into which we were pouring the molasses were jiggled rapidly, or if we 
wanted to know about the behavior before equilibrium was reached, prediction would 
require much more information. It would require, in particular, more information about 
the properties of molasses: its viscosity, the rapidity with which it “adapted” itself to the 
containing vessel and moved towards its “goal” of lowering its center of gravity. Likewise, 
to predict the short run behavior of an adaptive organism, or its behavior in a complex 
and rapidly changing environment, it is not enough to know its goals.  We must know 
also a great deal about its internal structure and particularly its mechanisms of 
adaptation. ”  
Simon (1959), p. 255; italics added. 
 14 
 
Simon criticized orthodox normative economics for ignoring how human beings actually 
behave and questioned the result that only rational agents survive the forces of competition – 
with orthodoxy’s Olympian assumptions (Simon, 1983) on how to formalize rational behavior, 
which was - at least as far as Simon was concerned – remote from any cognitive realism. 
Besides, the study of equilibrium requires little understanding of the characteristics of 
individuals in out-of-equilibrium situations, simply because normative economics has nothing to 
say about process and procedure. In the real world that Simon saw around him, there exists a lot 
of turbulence, not only generated by external shocks, that keeps the system out of equilibrium 
and agents needing to relocate their bearings almost ceaselessly.  
 
Furthermore, Simon stated “decision making under uncertainty” instead of “decision making 
under risk” in Simon (1959).  That is, an economic agent might respond to the changing 
environment in a personal way rather than knowing the objective probability of what outcomes 
might happen in the future.  This property brings more difficulties on the prediction of rational 
individual behavior by using so-called objective characteristics of the environment. 
 
Simon’s behavioral economics is almost comprehensively demonstrated by his encapsulation 
of Human Problem Solving and agents and institutions as Information Processing Systems.  
Although the problems which Simon dealt with are well structured problems, such as Chess 
playing, the combinatorial complexity of the problem is massive enough to prevent human 
players using mimmax strategies which are suggested in traditional game theory. In this paper, 
only some of Simon’s massive and wide ranging contributions are covered. The underpinning 
of CBE and Simon’s special role will be found in later sections and chapters. 
 
2    Underpinnings of Behavioral Economics 
 
In this section, different underpinnings and analytic tools of MBE and CBE will be briefly 
mentioned.  The purpose of this section is not to provide detailed theoretical and technical 
instructions for them, but aspire to make the clear distinctions on how the two lines are different 
fundamentally.  It is a slightly puzzling that this distinction has never been made earlier.  As 
one may realize from the following underpinnings and the sub-branches of MBE introduced in 
the previous section, MBE can be characterized as a massive magnet which attracts different 
resources, new tools and ways of explanations. We can almost claim that MBE has already 15 
 
become a new mainstream economics, as a consequence of MBE playing the role of a revised 
approach of orthodox economics rather than an alternative approach. On the other hand, CBE is 
developed on completely different grounds from MBE. From our point of view, MBE is fostered 
by Orthodox Economic Theory, Game Theory, Mathematical Finance Theory and Recursive
18 
Methods, Experimental Economics and Neuroeconomics, Computational Economics
19 and 
Subjective Probability Theory.  
 
CBE, in our reconstruction of it, on the other hand, is based fundamentally on a model of 
computation – hence, Computable Economics – computational complexity theory, nonlinear 
dynamics and algorithmic probability theory. 
 
2.1  Underpinnings of Modern Behavioral Economics 
 
2.1.1  Orthodox Economic Theory 
 
It is in human nature to aspire to predict, at least so the sages say and the traditional wisdom of 
many cultures concur
20.  Microeconomics, in general, is the study of individual choices and 
actions.  Gradually, economics has developed normative axioms
21 and theories on how the 
individual entities (including organizations) should make choices and how they seem to make 
choices.  There are, classically (but not necessarily exhaustively) the normative and positive 
approaches to behavior, respectively. In Neoclassical theory, economic agents are assumed to 
be fully rational and completely
22 informed. It is not that they know everything, but that they 
can know everything and there are means to learn – epistemology - and they know how to make 
the best choices for themselves (even if only probabilistically). Second, in order for their 
choices to be tractable, axioms (completeness, reflexiveness, transitivity, and continuity) of 
rational preference were devised, within classical mathematical formalisms – which simply 
means the mathematics of (Zermelo-Fraenkel) set theory plus some variant of the axiom of 
choice.  Individuals are assumed to have underlying preference orderings for all the alternatives 
                                                 
18 Not Recursion Theory. 
19 Not Computable Economics. 
20 In Tamil, Velupillai’s Mother Tongue, an ancient precept is: The Art of Good Government is the ability of the 
Minister to Predict Accurately. This is not a literal translation and does not even remotely convey the condensed 
wisdom in the original. 
21 We are, of course, aware that axioms have no normative status, except in so far as they reflect it on the basis of 
the implications derived, by some deductive process. 
22 Often this ‘completeness’ is probabilistic of a naïve variety. 16 
 
which are knowable, although the means of getting to know them is never specified. These 
rational preferences are, often, represented by a utility function, which is assumed to be well-
behaved. Third, the non-satiation assumption promises that the satiation point will never be 
reached, at least in the economic domain. Thus, the individuals are always in the state of the 
world where “more is better”.  
 
In passing, it could be mentioned that there have been serious and contentious discussions in the 
history of the development of economic theory as to whether utility should be cardinal or ordinal, 
since these might consequently result in differences in the way in which economists try to 
measure utility.  Eventually, ordinal utility seems to have reached dominance, although not very 
‘consistently’; subsequently the theory of individual decision making based on preference and 
choice based approaches were developed. 
   
2.1.2  Game Theory 
 
Game theory is a mathematical field in economics dealing with the situations when players 
gain payoff by interacting with each other strategically. Its origin can be attributed to von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)
23. Orthodox  game theory is also driven by “self-interest” 
and “utility maximizing” concepts, however, in order for the analysis to be tractable, infinite 
powers of reasoning and, often, a kind of common knowledge among players are further 
assumed. Together with these criteria, different notions of Nash and other kinds of strategic 
Equilibria, depending on the nature of games which are under consideration are defined and 
claimed to be able to be determined. The principles of finding Nash Equilibria include minmax 
criteria along with backward induction for repeated games or extensive games. Moreover, the 
Nash Equilibria in a game can be both pure strategies (the certain strategies) and mixed 
strategies (a set of probabilities over strategies). 
 
It may be pertinent to add that no game theoretically defined Nash equilibrium is computable 
and no algorithm which has been claimed to determine it can be implemented without appealing 
to undecidable disjunctions. 
 
                                                 
23 This is an ultra-naïve observation where we simply report a consensus view. We disagree that game theory, even 
in its strategic form, originates with either von Neumann-Morgenstern or with von Neumann’s 1928 paper. Our 
alternative history is outlined in several of Velupillai’s recent papers on computable economics. 17 
 
2.1.3  Mathematical Finance Theory and Recursive Methods 
 
A huge amount of mathematical theories and tools have been borrowed to develop finance 
theories and time series analysis.  In these exercises, different stochastic or random processes are 
imported to represent the data generating process of finance or economic time series, e.g.  
Brownian motion or Markov chains. The random processes applied here are based on measure 
theoretic concepts.   
 
Recursive methods in macroeconomics are built on dynamic programming, Markov decision 
processes and Kalman filtering and again, measure theory, underpinning orthodox theories of 
stochastic processes and probability, plays a central role – all within one or another form of 
nonconstructive and non-recursion theoretic real analysis (for example for dynamic 
programming the notion of one or another form of contraction mapping in a suitable metric 
space).   
 
Although the mathematical tools used are much more sophisticated than in non-dynamic 
methods – but only up to a point, economic entities are still modeled as optimizers (e.g. 
maximizing present values in intertemporal contexts, Value functions and Euler equations in the 
context of dynamic programming and optimal control formulations) where it is little realised 
that the analysis is around uncomputable equilibria (c.f.  Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004); Stokey 
and Lucas (1989) (with the collaboration of Edward C. Prescott)). 
 
2.1.4  Experimental Economics and Neuroeconomics 
 
Experimental Economics appears as tool for examining economic theories in computational, 
numerical and other obviously implementable ways in which idealized subjects are placed in 
artificial settings that purport to mimic the theoretical environment. Narrowly speaking, it is not 
categorized as a branch in economics, instead, it is a methodology for researchers to support or 
refute specific economic theories.  While, broadly, it can be considered to be cohabiting with 
behavioral economics. This is because – or claimed to be because - what people actually do can 
be observed in experimental environments, and almost of all the anomalies are found and 
induced from laboratory environments or field studies.  The methodology of experimental 
economics is heavily based on so-called induced value theory (Smith, 1976). Induced value 
theory suggests that in the controlled laboratory environment, if subjects are suitably motivated, 18 
 
experimenters can expect to obtain desirable induced values from choices of subjects on certain 
economic problems they are given to ‘solve’
24. This theory is obtained from non-satiation 
assumption, and monetary payment is the most commonly used reward for inducing real values 
from subjects. However, if economic agents are actually applying satisficing principle to the 
experiments they attend, i.e. they are satisfied by performing decently rather than trying their 
best or thinking hard in order to get the most reward, then results of experimental economics 
could be very misleading. 
 
Neuroeconomics is the new extension of experimental economics incorporating neuroscience to 
obtain the data of brain activity, simultaneously, when the subject is in laboratory environment. 
It is also viewed as a young subfield of behavioral economics which is believed will be the main 
focus in the future. A popular claim is the dual system in our brain supervising our judgmental 
and intuitive thinking, corresponding to rational and emotional behaviors. It provides the 
technique to collect data in the brain for examining how and when the behavior of decision 
makers could deviate from rational and consistent behavior. A recent survey can be found in 
Camerer (2007); Glimcher et al. (2005); Rustichini (2005); a critical view of the claims of 
Neuroeconomics can be found in Rubinstein (2008).  
 
The linkage of neuroscience and human behavior is seriously debatable, but we will reserve our 
discussion and contribution to this critique for a later exercise.  
 
2.1.5  Computational Economics 
 
Computational Economics is also an extension of experimental economics from another 
perspective, i.e. the subjects are not human subjects but software subjects. So far, there are at 
least two well-developed lines, which are heterogeneous agent models and agent-based 
modeling, and the survey for these respective lines can be found in Hommes (2006) and LeBaron 
(2006). A thorough critique of the excessive claims of both these lines – and other strands of 
supposed computational economics – is given in Velupillai & Zambelli (2011).  
 
Heterogeneous agent models seem to have been inspired by related results on cellular automata 
modeling in the physical sciences, resulting in unpredictable and complex phenomena generated 
                                                 
24 But this is not the search for ‘solutions’ in any kind of ‘problem solving’ context, as in CBE. 19 
 
by simple interaction rules. The claims in this line of research are as vacuous as those made by 
agent-based modellers in finance and economics. They both suffer from a serious lack of 
scholarship and a complete unhinging of their foundations in either serious computability theory 
or even a familiarity with the fruitful and frontier research in the interface between dynamical 
system theory, numerical analysis and computability. These interactions were the fulcrum 
around which von Neumann and Ulam, Conway and Wolfram and Turing (1952) pioneered their 
studies of emergent complex dynamics in interacting systems with simple rules of interaction. 
 
2.1.6  Subjective Probability Theory 
 
Subjective expected utility theory was proposed by Savage in 1954, between the period in 
which Edwards wrote his first and second survey papers on behavioral economics (Edwards, 
1954, 1961). Savage followed the axiomatizations along the lines proposed by Ramsey (Ramsey, 
1931) and De finetti (de Finetti, 1937), and applied Bayes’ rule for updating the prior 
probabilities over time. 
 
The idea of subjective expected utility ‘first’ appeared in Modern Behavioral Economics
25 
through the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), when building descriptive theory of 
decision making by individuals under risk. Their theory in turn borrowed heavily from Edwards 
(1962) and who in turn built on Savage (1954). Both Edwards and later Kahneman and Tversky, 
however do not refer to Bruno de Finetti whose contributions are not mentioned in these two 
papers. There seems to be some ambiguity while they talk about probabilities in their model and 
this gets particularly unclear when they refer to decision weights
26. 
 
“In prospect theory, the value of each outcome is multiplied by a decision weight. 
Decision weights are inferred from choices between prospects much as subjective 
probabilities are inferred from preferences in the Ramsey-Savage approach. However, 
decision weights are not probabilities: they do not obey the probability axioms and they 
should not be interpreted as measures of degree or belief. ” 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p. 280 
 
In this framework decision weight measures over stated probabilities do not obey the property of 
                                                 
25 Ignoring, for the moment, the much earlier work of Edwards, who was more than a mentor to Kahneman and 
Tversky. 
26 Decision weights, in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), are a measure associated with each probability, reflecting 
the impact of probability on the overall value of the prospect. 20 
 
additivity
27 . In the Savage-de Finetti framework, the sum of the probabilities over exclusive 
and exhaustive events adds up to unity. In prospect theory, the sum of the decision weights is 
considered less then one in most of the cases.  However, while they invoke the Ramsey’s 
approach of inferring these decision weights from choices, it naturally raises the question as to 
what these decision weights are? Although the propositions of decision weights are derived in 
the paper, it is unclear how they are different from degrees of belief – although different they 
must be! 
 
In Edwards (1962), two categories of subjective probability models are introduced: additive 
and nonadditive ones
28.  In Edward’s elaboration, first of all, subjective probability is a 
number ranging from zero to one and describing a person’s assessment of the likeliness of an 
event.  Further, it is assumed objective probabilities exist, and they are related to subjective 
probabilities.  Edwards argued that it is meaningless to debate whether objective probabilities 
can be defined, in contrast to de Finetti’s and Savage’s firm belief that there are no objective 
probabilities. He goes on to make a distinction between risk and uncertainty. He argues that 
there are some cases, such as die tosses, which have “conventional” probabilities over their 
outcomes. Consequently, these events which can be given objective probabilities, are defined as 
risky; otherwise, they are uncertain. However, both Edwards (1962) and Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) considered only risky cases. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is a revision of prospect 
theory including uncertain outcomes.   
 
The concept of subjective probability is used ambiguously – to put it mildly - in modern 
behavioral economics. On the one hand, MBE introduced the idea of personal probability, 
defining it and mapping it over the objective probabilities in risky choices.  This is quite 
different from the kind of subjective probabilities proposed by de Finetti, and does not 
necessarily follow the axioms of subjective probabilities.  
 
De Finetti’s works became relatively more familiar only after the series of lectures he gave in the 
                                                 
27 Additivity of probability is defined as follows: If n numbers of events form a complete set of incompatible events 
(meaning exactly one of the events has to be true), then the probability of the logical sum (the logical sum of a 
group of events is true, if and only if, one of the events is true) is equal to the sum of their respective probabilities. 
Since n is a finite natural number, so the definition above is more precisely finite additivity. On the other hand, 
when n approaches to infinity, it becomes countable additivity. 
 
28 The distinction of additive and non-additive probability, made in Edwards (1962) is that additive probabilities 
sum up to specific numbers, non-additive ones are not supposed to do so – then, what are they, if they do not do so? 
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Institut Henri Poincare ´ and these lectures were published in 1937.  For De Finetti, the theory 
of subjective probability originated from his belief in a subjectivist philosophy.  Subjective 
probabilities of outcomes, for him, are the different degrees of belief regarding the 
occurrences of events that people possess. These degrees of belief, however, need not be the 
same for all the people. In an attempt to find admissible ways of assigning numbers to different 
degrees of belief, de Finetti constructed axioms over events and their probabilities, especially, 
through the logical relations (pioneered by John M. Keynes) of events. By standardizing a 
random quantity into 1 and 0 representing the truth and falsity of an event and by introducing 
the coherence criteria, de Finetti derives some basic consequences. The most important one 
amongst them is the concept of finite additivity, where the sum of assignments over finite 
events (logical sums) sums to unity. More specifically, for de Finetti, the qualitative criteria 
regarding coherence appears first, and then, the individuals are allowed to freely attach numbers 
to their degrees of belief over a complete set of incompatible events (i.e., exhaustive and 
exclusive events), however, within the coherence constraint. This way, a qualitative idea of 
coherence is linked to the mathematical expressions of (subjective) probability. The coherence 
principle demands consistency in assignments, based on the idea that no arbitrary gains should 
be available for either player by accepting certain books of bet (the Dutch Book argument). In 
order to satisfy the coherence principle, the sum of probabilities of the event has to be unity 
(the necessary and sufficient condition of coherence). Besides, it should be noted that Bayes’ 
conditional probability formula is derived in turn from coherence, and it is not taken as a 
definition in de Finetti’s theory of probability. 
 
Before de Finetti, Frank Ramsey gave a talk in 1926 and the lecture was published in Ramsey 
(1931), of which de Finetti was not aware until 1937. Both of them, almost simultaneously but 
independently, formulated subjective probability as a degree of belief held by an individual and 
devoted their efforts to axiomatize it. In particular, de Finetti assumed and insisted only the use 
of finite additivity, because the requirement of coherence implies finite additivity.  On the other 
hand, Ramsey simply and intuitively addressed this issue saying that it is meaningless to 
discuss infinite events, because he doubted a human being’s capability of handling infinite 
events. 
 
“[N]othing has been said about degrees of belief when the number of alternatives is 
infinite.  About this I have nothing useful to say, except that I doubt if the mind is 
capable of contemplating more than a finite number of alternatives. It can consider 
questions to which an infinite number of answers are possible, but in order to consider 22 
 
the answers it must lump them into a finite number of groups. ” 
 Ramsey (1931), p. 183
29. 
 
In contrast to finite additivity, frequentists and measure theorists advocate and justify the use of 
countable additivity (or denumerable additivity, infinite additivity and σ-additivity) by invoking 
the strong law of large numbers (Borel) and relative frequency in limits. Howson (2009) 
discusses these issues in detail and supports de Finetti’s idea of finite additivity, but not, in our 
opinion, in a convincing way. 
 
In particular, we fundamentally disagree with Howson that ‘de Finetti himself would have 
recommended’ doing ‘probabilistic reasoning … in an informal metatheory consisting of the 
usual mathematics of analysis and set theory’ so that: 
 
“Deductive consistency and probabilistic consistency are .. subspecies of the same 
fundamental notion of the solvability of equations subject to constraints: those of a 
classical truth-valuation in the deductive case, and the rules of finitely additive formal 
probability in the probabilistic case.” 
Howson, op.cit, pp. 55-6; italics added. 
 
This is a fundamental violation of every tenet of epistemology and methodology advocated by 
de Finetti. Moreover, Howson does not seem to realise that it is provably hard to devise 
procedures to validate ‘classical truth-valuation’. 
  
Being aware of the distinction between finite and infinite additivity, Edwards (1962, p.117) 
considers the infinite case to be more interesting as compared to the finite case
30. More 
recently, Bayesian approaches, together with Savage’s notion of subjective probability, are 
challenged by empirical evidences that suggest agents are incapable of applying the Bayesian 
rule to revise their prior probabilities. Case based theory, which is considered as one of the new 
foundations for behavioral decision theory, bases the probabilities assigned to different events on 
previous histories regarding similar cases and consequently, adopts a (non-algorithmic) 
                                                 
29 It may be apposite to point out that Ramsey’s equally distinguished fellow-Kingsman, a few years later, in his 
monumental classic on computability theory appealed to the same kind of ‘finiteness’ for the same kind of reason 
(cf. Turing, 1936, p. 249). 
30 Refer Edwards(1962), p.117, italics added: 
 “As will become clear later, finite event sets immensely complicate the mathematics, and at the same time 
reduce the value of the model by making it inapplicable to situations in which the set of possible events is 
infinite. Although this paper discusses finite models below, I consider such models far less interesting than 
the infinite models,” 
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frequentist approach for the probabilities. (c.f. Barberis and Thaler (2005); Camerer and 
Loewenstein (2004)). 
 
2.2  Underpinnings of Classical Behavioral Economics 
"If we hurry , we can catch up to Turing on the path he pointed out to us so many years 
ago." 
Simon (1996), p. 101. 
 
    Classical Behavioural Economics was underpinned, always and at any and every level of 
theoretical and applied analysis, by a model of computation. Invariably, although not always 
explicitly, it was Turing's model of computation.  
 
    The fundamental focus in classical behavioural economics is on decision problems faced by 
human problem solvers, the latter viewed as information processing systems., as we emphasise 
right through the analysis in this paper. All of these terms are given computational content, ab 
initio. But given the scope of this paper we shall not have the possibility of a full 
characterisation. The ensuing `bird's eye' view must suffice for now. 
 
    A decision problem asks whether there exists an algorithm to decide whether a mathematical 
assertion does or does not have a proof; or a formal problem does or does not have an 
algorithmic solution. Thus the characterization makes clear the crucial role of an underpinning 
model of computation; secondly, the answer is in the form of a yes/no response. Of course, there 
is the third alternative of `undecidable', too. It is in this sense of decision problems that we 
interpret the word `decisions' here. 
 
    As for `problem solving', we shall assume, as pointed out many times in this paper, that this is 
to be interpreted in the sense in which it is defined and used in the monumental classic by 
Newell and Simon (1972), which is, in our opinion, an application of the theory underlying 
Turing (1954). 
    Finally, the model of computation is the Turing model, subject to the Church-Turing Thesis. 
    To give a rigorous mathematical foundation for bounded rationality and satisficing, as 
decision problems
31,  it is necessary to underpin them in a dynamic model of choice in a 
                                                 
31     The three most important classes of decision problems that almost characterise the subject of computational 
complexity theory, underpinned by a model of computation -- in general, the model of computation in this context 24 
 
computable framework. However, these are not two separate problems. Any formalization 
underpinned by a model of computation in the sense of computability theory is, dually, 
intrinsically dynamic. Moreover, Decidable-Undecidable, Solvable-Unsolvable, Computable-
Uncomputable, etc., are concepts that are given content algorithmically, within a model of 
computation. 
 
Now consider the Boolean formula: 
  (x₁∨x₂∨x₃)∧(x₁∨{¬x₂})∧(x₂∨{¬x₃})∧(x₃∨{¬x₁})∧({¬x₁∨{¬x₂}∨{¬x₃})   …… (2) 
Remark: Each subformula within parenthesis is called a clause; The variables and their 
negations that constitute clauses are called literals; It is `easy' to `see' that for the truth value of 
the above Boolean formula to be t(xi) = 1, all the subformulas within each of the parenthesis will 
have to be true. It is equally `easy' to see that no truth assignments whatsoever can satisfy the 
formula such that its global value is true. This Boolean formula is unsatisfiable. This is the kind 
of ‘satisfiability’ we ascribe to Simon’s notion of ‘satisficing’. 
 
Problem: SAT -- The Satisfiability Problem 
 
    Given m clauses, Ci (i=1,….,m), containing the literals (of) xj (j=1,….,n), determine if the 
formula C₁∧C₂∧…….∧Cm is satisfiable. 
    Determine means `find an (efficient) algorithm'. To date it is not known whether there is an 
efficient algorithm to solve the satisfiability problem -- i.e., to determine the truth value of a 
Boolean formula. In other words, it is not known whether SAT ∈P. But: 
 
Theorem: SAT ∈NP 
 
Definition: A Boolean formula consisting of many clauses connected by conjunction (i.e., ∧) is 
said to be in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF). 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
is the Nondeterministic Turing Machine --  are the P, NP and NP-Complete classes. Concisely, but not quite 
precisely, they can be described as follows: 
 
1.  P defines the class of computable problems that are solvable in time bounded by a polynomial 
function of the size of the input; 
2.  NP is the class of computable problems for which a solution can be verified in polynomial time; 
3.  A computable problem lies in the class called NP-Complete if every problem that is in NP can be 
reduced to it in polynomial time. 25 
 
    Finally, we have Cook's famous theorem: 
 
Theorem:   Cook's Theorem 
SAT is NP - Complete 
 
It is in the above kind of context and framework within which we are interpreting Simon's vision 
of behavioural economics. In this framework optimization is a very special case of the more 
general decision problem approach. The real mathematical content of satisficing
32 s best 
interpreted in terms of the satisfiability problem of computational complexity theory, the 
framework used by Simon consistently and persistently - and a framework to which he himself 
made pioneering contributions. 
 
We have only scratched a tiny part of the surface of the vast canvass on which Simon sketched 
his vision of a computably underpinned behavioural economics. Nothing in Simon's behavioural 
economics - i.e., in Classical Behavioural Economics - was devoid of computable content. There 
was - is - never any epistemological deficit in any computational sense in classical behavioural 
economics (unlike in Modern Behavioural Economics, which is copiously endowed with 
epistemological deficits, from the ground up).. 
 
3    Classical Behavioral Economics – Further Notes on the Special 
Role of Herbert Simon 
 
A basic tenet of Simon’s approach to behavioural economics is that the limitations of cognitive 
processing should be linked, in some formal way, with the definable limitations of computation, 
subject to the Church-Turing Thesis (without any space or time constraints).  The limits of 
computational complexity, on the other hand, are naturally bounded by the time and space.  
Behavioral models, in which agents are supposed to exercise rational behavior, whether 
psychologically more realistically constrained or not, hypothesizing capabilities transcending 
these theoretical and practical limitations are, for Simon, empirically meaningless. Simon has 
taken the limits of human cognition into account, transformed into computational complexity 
                                                 
32     In Simon (1997), p. 295, Simon clarified the semantic sense of the word satisfice: 
 
"The term `satisfice', which appears in the Oxford English Dictionary as a Northumbrian synonym for 
`satisfy', was borrowed for this new use by H. A. Simon (1956) in `Rational Choice and the Structure of 
the Environment' ". 26 
 
measures, for describing agents who make decisions. This is why we are convinced that 
computable foundations and nonlinear dynamics can both be found in Information Processing 
Systems
33, the paradigmatic formalization of agents and institutions in the kind of behavioural 
economics Simon advocated. 
 
 
3.1  Bounded Rationality 
The idea of bounded rationality was first proposed by Herbert Simon in the paper titled “A 
Behavioral Model of Rational Choice”, which was published in 1953.  It was further polished 
and republished with a same title as the much more famous Simon (1955) and was phrased also 
as “limited rationality”. In the same paper, an example was demonstrated where agents tend to 
be satisfied by using certain information they have and avoid information they do not really 
have any means of obtaining in algorithmically meaningful ways.  They anticipate something 
acceptable in the near future without calculating any probabilities or assigning probabilities to 
prospective future events. Simon further described human behavior as “intendedly rational” in 
Simon (1957, p.196). The book “Models of Man” collected the papers which he published in 
early to mid 50s.  It is where the phrase Bounded Rationality appeared for the first time, in the 
introduction of Part IV (p.196). The phrase was, then, much maligned in its uses and misuses, 
compared to the original definition and formalizations by Simon. Subsequently, bounded 
rationality became one of the frequently used terminologies of MBE. On the contrary, in 
Simon’s advocacy, human beings can solve their problems relying on heuristics and intuition 
without a given model in mind34 . Therefore, there seems to be a mismatch between the 
contemporary interpretation of bounded rationality and its original definitions. In Simon’s point 
of view, human beings have no capability and willingness to always find procedures to reach the 
best alternative, even if such a thing is meaningfully definable, or make the ‘Olympian choice.’ 
Reasoning capabilities, formally defined as algorithmic procedures, are constrained by the limits 
of computability theory and, at an empirical level, by measures of computational complexity.  
 
                                                 
33 Agents and institutions and all other kinds of decision making entities, in CBE, are information processing 
systems which, in their ideal form are Turing Machines. 
34 This may well be one way for agents in CBE to transcend the limits of Turing Computability subject to the 
Church-Turing Thesis. However, we do not subscribe to the view that Simon assumed that the limits of Turing 
Computability are violable; we believe Simon could have resorted to oracle computations, when necessary, and also 
formalize via nondeterministic and alternating Turing Machines to encapsulate procedures – heuristics and other 
similar algorithms – that give an impression to the uninitiated that there are formal means to transcend Turing 
Computability. 27 
 
Simon’s definition of bounded (limited, procedural) rationality encapsulates different notions, 
such as limited attention, limited cognitive capacity of computation, satisficing, and sequential 
decision making (naturally dynamic) (Simon, 1955, 1956).  That is to say, it is not evident and 
admissible to assume that human begins are able to exhaust all the information and make the 
best choice out of it. Indeed, the notion of ‘best’ is given content via the formulation of problem 
solving by information processing systems in what is known in metamathematics as a decision 
problem. In such a framework one seeks algorithms to solve problems and classifies them as 
‘easy’ or ‘hard’ using measures of computational complexity. There is no such thing as a ‘best’ 
algorithm or a ‘best’ heuristic. 
 
Therefore, the dynamics of non-maximizing agents can be described adequately in the following 
way. The knowledge we have, and interpretation of the world where we are living in, are 
associated with our experience and memories. Gradually, our tastes and understanding are 
constructed. The process of construction is the central pre-analytic, Schumpeterian visionary 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 51, ff), stage in the decision problem. Therefore, the pursuit for stable 
gain in taste and knowledge also relies on what has been constructed. This is one part of 
requiring a program to modify itself. The unhappiness and satisfaction which are associated with 
our aspirations depends on whether the desires are satisfied in terms of our anticipation. The 
aspiration level expands with satisfaction and shrinks with disappointment. Nonetheless, the 
memory that is stored in our mind prevents our aspiration level from becoming null. Thus, we 
are in the loop of unhappiness and satisfaction, a loop given formal content via the structure of a 
program for a Turing Machine or a heuristic implemented on one of them (Simon, 1991). 
 
3.2  Human Problem Solving 
The notions of bounded rationality have been encoded implicitly and explicitly into the 
information processing system which was proposed in Simon et al. (1958) and analyzed 
thoroughly with detailed recording and interview with human subjects in Newell and Simon 
(1972).  IPSs have shown their capability of solving problems, such as cryptarithmetic, logic, 
and chess games, algorithmically.  In their conclusion, it is suggested that task environments of 
greater complexity and openness ought to be studied. Thus, we can see that they are on the track 




Simon’s notion of bounded rationality, encapsulated within the formalization of an IPS is, in 
turn, used in simulating (representing) human problem solving.  Simulation, even if not 
precisely theorized in Simon’s monumental work on Human Problem Solving, nevertheless is 
defined in analogy with the dynamics intrinsic to partial differential functions or their machine 
embodiment in the definition of the processing of information by a Turing Machine, or its 
specialized variants. Problem solving is the implementation, via heuristics, themselves 
algorithms, of search processes for paths from initial states to the target states.  
The complexity of a problem solving process – the complexity, therefore, of the algorithm that is 
implemented in the search processes from initial conditions to ‘halting’ states – defines its 
hardness on a well-defined computational complexity measure. This also means that there could 
be problems that will be subject to the famous theorem of the halting problem for Turing 
Machines.  
 
The methods that a problem solver uses are strongly associated with his or her memory and 
experience. The accumulated knowledge in the memory will form the heuristics – the current 
state of the program and its structure - to guide the problem solver him(her)self. Intuition is 
copiously invoked, and defined computationally and cognitively, in seamlessly leading the 
problem solver to one or another path at a node, when he or she faces a huge number of possible 
choices, in the Nondeterministic Turing Machine formulation of a problem.  
 
3.2.1  Theory of Human Problem Solving 
 
Literally, we need a problem and the problem solver to achieve problem solving, and the problem 
should be presented, recognized and understood. A problem is faced when one wants to do 
something about a particular task but does not know what series of actions can be done to 
implement it immediately. The three main factors that characterise problems are the huge size of 
possible solutions, the dispersion of actual solutions and the high cost of search.  The problem 
space contains a set of elements which represent knowledge, a set of operators which generate 
new knowledge from existing knowledge, an initial state of knowledge, a problem which is 
specified by a set of desired states, and the total knowledge available to problem solvers.  
The problem can be further formulated (represented) by set-predicate formulations and search 
formulation. 
 
Representations  In the former representation, the set of elements includes symbolic objects 29 
 
which are all possible solutions, not necessarily formally definable. Precisely, the set can be 
generated by a certain enumerative procedure.  Thus, the problem solver will not be given the 
entire set, rather, is given a process to generate elements out of the set. This is exactly analogous 
to Brouwerian constructive spreads, arising out of free choice sequences. In a search 
representation, solutions as elements of a set, have the format of sequences.  For instance, a 
proof of a theory contains a sequence of steps and chess representations contain continuations 
for some players. 
Task Environment  A Task Environment describes the attributes that are associated with the 
problem that problem solvers encounter.  It consists of external and internal representations, 
where the former is the format in which the problem is exactly presented and the latter stands for 
the subjective representation the player applies.  Accordingly, not only the presentation of the 
current problem, but also the ability and intelligence of the problem solver should be 
considered. This is because players with diverse abilities may perceive the problem differently. It 
should be made very clear that in Simon’s framework of human problem solving, as well as in 
Turing’s considerations of Solvable and Unsolvable Problems, concepts like ability and 
intelligence are precisely defined, even if pro tempore, in terms of computability theory. 
 
Information Processing System  The information processing system which is capable of 
problem solving can be characterized as follows. An IPS is a serial, adaptive (dynamic), and 
deterministic system which receives input and generates output. It is composed of internal 
building blocks such as long term memory (LTM), short term memory (STM) and external 
memory (EM). LTM and STM share identical patterns but are distinguished by their size. LTM 
can contain all the symbolic objects without limitation, while STM contains only five to seven 
symbols. The fact of sequential decision making is inherent in IPS; moreover, how a problem 
solver retrieves objects from LTM to STM relies on heuristic search. This is exactly equivalent to 
the partial recursive function formalization of computability or a Turing Machine definition of a 
computable process (cf. Davis, 1958, Chapter 1, in particular, and Part 1, in general; indeed, 
reading and mastering the foundational mathematics of computability theory simultaneously 
with an approach to problem solving in the Simon or Turing sense is the best way to understand 
all the equivalences inherent in all these formalizations.). 
 
3.2.2  Heuristics 
 
Heuristic is a method of “Rule of Thumb” that serves as a guide in searching. Intuitively, it is 30 
 
an ability and process to refer to one’s own memory and experience and lead oneself to focus 
on appropriate subsets of knowledge. Without external help, one can learn and discover new 
knowledge by him/herself. Essentially, it is the ability of a Machine to reconstruct its internal 
structure by itself. 
 
When an IPS receives information form the task environment, it generates the goals and the 
methods for the achievement by heuristic search. If heuristics cannot achieve a satisfactory 
solution, then either the heuristic method will be reprogrammed or the representation, namely, 
the internal representation in the task environment, will be reformulated. It will be clear that 
‘satisfactory’ here is precisely defined by means of time and space computational complexity 
measures. In short, IPS and task environment are interdependent, and the process of change is 
learning. This is one way the human problem solver as a learner encounters him/herself as a 
learning machine. 
 
In addition to bounded rationality and satisficing, Simon uncovered an interesting property, 
which became a recurring theme in his works, observed in many entities. In 1951, when Simon 
read Goodwin (1947), it inspired him to think about dynamical systems in both economic and 
mathematical senses. Later, the concept of Near Decomposability, culled from Goodwin’s notion 
of unilateral (weak) coupling, appeared in his papers and he applied it to diverse problems, such 
as identifying causality, counterfactuals, aggregation, organizational behavior, evolution of 
organisms, human and machine thinking. Near decomposability has its rigorous mathematical 
definition and characterisations, while conceptually, the idea can also be connected to heuristics. 
Especially, Simon explains in the paper Simon (2002) why near decomposability, appeared as 
hierarchical structure of an organism, can result in greater speed of evolution. When the 
hierarchical structure is applied to the problem and problem solver in human problem solving 
circumstances, then evolution is analogous to learning and discovery. 
 
Near decomposability in human problem solving can be interpreted as decomposing a problem 
into subproblems when the subproblems are not completely independent. In Polya’s little book 
Polya (1945), “heuristic method” was demonstrated by an educator decomposing and 
reformulating a problem step by step for a student who is asked to solve the problem. Turing, 
at the same time, also proposed his idea of a child’s machine and education process in Turing 
(1950, p.456). The influence of Polya, Turing and Goodwin are unambiguously evident in 
Newell and Simon (1972); and in Simon et al. (1958) for their postulation of the internal 31 
 






35: Heuristics and Problem Solving 
Archimedes felicitously separated the question of discovery from that of proof; the former could 
be done experimentally – both in the classical sense and in the sense of thought experiments. For 
the latter, he used both the technique of proof by reductio ad absurdum and ad contradictionem. 
It was only with the formalism of problem solving that this separation was healed. But that had 
to wait till Brouwer challenged the latter day Platonists in the early 20
th century, Kolmogorov 
re-integrated solvability with proof and Church and Turing put it all together in one fell swoop 
as a computational paradigm. 
 
There were many who lit the path between Archimedes and Simon, none more so than that 
father of the Bohemian Enlightenment, Bernard Bolzano. He resurrected the Aristotelian triple 
division of methods of inquiry into  induction, deduction and retroduction. The latter as the 
apagogic  procedure  identical  with  reductio  ad  absurdum  in  the  context  of  what  he  called 
HEURETIC (cf. Bolzano, 1972, Books Four and Five). This became, in the hands of Polya and 
Simon, heuristics – the art of guided search in a complex space.  
 
One part of Bolzano’s methodology that is reflected in Simon’s practice comes via the influence 
the former had on Polya’s approach to problem solving. The other part of the influence, perhaps 
via Norwood Russell Hanson, was in Simon identifying the logic of discovery with the logic of 
retroduction in his forceful and uncompromising critique of Popper’s nihilism regarding the 
feasibility of a theory and logic of discovery: 
“This mystical view [i.e., Popper’s view] towards discovery …. has not gone without challenge. 
Peirce coined the term ‘retroduction’ as a label for the systematic processes leading to discovery; 
                                                 
35 This appendix, outlining the origins of the notion of heuristics and reproducing pp. 181-2 of Velupillai (2000), is 
included to circumvent and prevent, if possible, questions raised about the role of a problem solving approach to 
economic theory and decision theory. More particularly, during the presentation of an earlier draft of this paper by 
the first author, questions by people who have either not read Simon on problem solving and its role in enriching 
economic decision processes, or who have no familiarity with constructive mathematics (or, more likely, both), 
made it clear that at least a mild clarification is necessary. The inclusion of the section from the defining work of 
Computable Economics here is also to emphasise that problem solving is the fulcrum around which constructive 
mathematics, computability theory, computable economics and classical behavioural economics are brought 
together – and that it was a fulcrum that has been around for at least about a decade and a half. 32 
 
while Norwood Hanson, in his Patterns of Discovery, revived that term and gave us a careful 
account of the retroductive path that led Kepler to the elliptical orbits of the planets. …  
Hanson made his case for retroduction by examining historical examples of scientific discovery. 
He did not propose an explicit formal theory of the retroductive process .. 
It is the aim of this paper to clarify the nature of retroduction, and to explain in what sense one 
can speak of a ‘logic of discovery’ or ‘logic of retroduction’. Like Hanson, I shall proceed from 
examples of retroductive processes…” 
Simon, 1977, ch. 5.4, pp.326-7. 
 
 
Bolzano confined his application of the retroductive process, i.e., the apagogic procedure, to the 
mathematical question of ascertaining the truth of a proposition. However, ‘ascertaining the 
truth of a proposition’ was an instance of ‘problem solving’, which is why it entered Polya’s 
scheme of things seamlessly. Bolzano’s criteria for the solution of a problem, the successful 
demonstration of a proposition is predicated upon two requirements, even before the thought 
experiment is conceived: firstly, the proposition to be demonstrated must be chosen with care; 
secondly, it must be tested for its consequences in every conceivable way
36. Simon adheres to 
these  two  strictures  almost  religiously  and  his  sustained  criticism  of  ‘armchair  theorizing’ 
reflects the importance he gives to the second of Bolzano’s criteria for the consideration of a 
proposition as worthy of attention. He goes beyond Bolzano, of course, because he goes that 
extra distance with the testing of propositions: not only as thought experiments; but also as 
components in real experiments. He also goes the extra distance in suggesting a theory for the 
careful selection of the relevant proposition, and that theory, too, is computational. 
 
Bolzano’s testing proceeds as follows: 
“If the mere clear representation of a proposition M does not lead to a judgement about it, or if 
this judgement does not appear reliable enough, the next stage in its testing is that we attempt to 
deduce, either from M alone or from M together with other already known premises, several 
consequences and from these further consequences, etc. … This procedure of showing the truth 
of proposition M, and thus of solving the indicated problem, is generally called the reduction to 
absurdity, or apagogic procedure. Examples are common in the mathematical sciences…” 
ibid, p.373; first set of italics added. 
 
Turing’s characterization of the computable numbers can be interpreted as distinguishing 
between numbers that are defined by pure existential statements and those that can be 
algorithmically defined. This is why standard mathematical economics is replete with existential 
theorems without the slightest concern over their constructive or algorithmic status. This is 
particularly true of modern behavioural economics, even when facile claims on heuristics are 
made. A subject whose fundamental entities are defined over the whole of the real number 
                                                 
36 Not in the preposterous Popperian sense of attempts to falsify it.  33 
 
system will, naturally, not worry too much about the subset that is numerically meaningful in a 
constructive or algorithmic sense. It is also why economic theory has not been a pleasant 
playing field for those of us who would like to interpret the cardinal aim of the subject to be 
problem solving and who would, therefore, insist on characterizing rational agents as meaningful 
problem-solvers and would also indulge in hair-splitting about the importance of methods for 
solving problems.  
 
The skeptical economic theorists might not find the above paragraph particularly convincing. 
What is the difference between problem-solving on the subset of the computable numbers or 
constructive numbers and problem-solving on the whole of the real number system, the skeptic 
may ask? There is a fundamental and foundational difference, which is best captured in an 
important theoretical contribution made by Kolmogorov, a long time ago: 
“In addition to theoretical logic, which systemizes the proof schemata of theoretical 
truths, one can systematize the schemata of solution of problems. …. 
…. The calculus of problems is formally identical with the Brouwerian intuitionistic 
logic, which has recently been formulated by Mr Heyting. … [I]t follows that one should 
consider the solution of problems as the independent goal of mathematics (in addition to 
the proofs of theoretical propositions). 
Kolmogorov (1932), pp. 58-65. 
 
Our
37 belief – imparted to Velupillai by his teacher, mentor and friend, Richard Goodwin – is, 
therefore, that economic theory should be about problem solving
38.  
 
3.3. Classical Behavioral Economics and Computable Economics 
 
 3.3.1   Satisficing, SAT and Diophantine Problems 
 
The ‘senior’ author of this paper advocated that the faithful encapsulation of Simon’s bounded 
rationality and satisficing ought to be through models of computation in the context of decision 
problems. Particularly, he suggests posing problems of rational choices as SAT problems 
(satisfiability problem) (Velupillai, 2010a). A SAT problem looks for the truth assignments of 
                                                 
37 More strictly, Velupillai’s belief, in this context and given his background, is what is meant here. 
38 A view to which even Lucas (2009) seems to subscribe, belatedly, not, of course, in classical behavioural 
economics mode, nor in any kind of constructive or computable mathematical frameworks. This analogy is very 
similar to the way Simon (1978, p. 17, footnote 2) referred to Becker’s notion of ‘irrationality’  (Becker, 1962), as 
follows: 




the arguments which can make the global statement true. If such assignments can be found, then 
the SAT problem is satisfiable.  
 
Solving SAT problems can be formulated, equivalently, as linear Diophantine equations, linear 
systems with nonnegative integer variables, or integer linear programming problems. 
Theoretically, SAT is NP- Complete (Cooke’s theorem), that is, a SAT problem is not solvable in 
nonderministic polynomial time in its inputs, but can be verified in polynomial time. However, 
the ‘senior’ author has realized very recently that Simon’s notions should be better formalized in 
terms of space computational complexity. In particular, SAT can be solved with a linear space 
algorithm. An intuitive explanation might be that in real human problem solving, subjects are 
never given sufficient amount of time to make decisions, rather, they are trained to restructure 
their short-term memory in order to process a problem in a given period of time. Subsequently, 
Velupillai has proved, via a duality between computability and dynamic systems, that Simon’s 
information processing system is capable of computation universality which is the relevant model 
of computation for rational choice. Furthermore, orthodox notions of rationality (through 
optimization) has been shown as a special (easy) case of the more general (difficult) case of SAT 
problem, in terms of models of computation in a decision problem context.  
 
3.3.2 Chess and Go 
 
Like many other strategic games, though the final target is to defeat the opponent in one’s own 
way, Chess players care about many other actions while the game is ongoing. For example, it is 
important to capture, block and otherwise threaten the opponent. These are the sub-goals that 
come to players’ mind alternatively, simultaneously to playing the game with the global goal, 
and in the pensive phases between moves. Being aware of the sub-goals, players can reduce 
their attention to relatively small groups of good moves and play accordingly.  
 
Go and Chess are very fundamentally different. GO has no concrete configuration of terminal 
conditions, like “Check-mate” in Chess. Instead, a GO game is finished when both players pass, 
and the side who occupies greater territory wins. This is a most intricate ‘stopping rule’ for the 
program to implement the process of playing GO by a Turing Machine. The best moves in the 
GO games are even more meaningless than the ones in Chess. Similarly, though it is difficult to 
list out all the terminal positions in Chess, it is very possible to decide whether each 
configuration belongs to the set of Check-mate. It is only possible for some of the games of GO. 35 
 
Unlike Chess, GO players rarely benefited by playing forcefully or aggressively – assuming 
these concepts can be given formal definitions in the relevant mathematics - because by doing 
that they can create unforeseeable ‘dangerous’ configurations to their own groups as well.  
 
A Go game can be officially played on a 9 x 9, 13 x 13, and 19 x 19 board. Practically, Go 
games can be set from 2 x 2, 3 x 3,…, 9 x 9,…,13 x 13,…,19 x 19,…boards. The combinatorial 
complexity increases exponentially when the board sized is enlarged. Thus, the complexity of 
GO games can be expanded theoretically to countable infinities, of a kind. This is the flexibility 
that the Chess game may lack.  
 
The main task in playing GO is to enclose some areas on the board, so that the stones of the 
opponent which are in this area have no space to escape and are captured.  On the other hand, 
when a group of stones are in danger of being captured, the task is to create holes (eyes) to save 
a region. No matter how big the board size is, the warfare will be localized into separate regions 
on the board. When the game is being played, the attribution of some regions can be determined 
and it is known for both players that there is no need to fight on those regions any more. That is 
to say, the players will decompose the board into several blocks and try to invade or defense 
those regions. We conjecture, therefore, that near decomposability will turn out to be a useful 
way of representing some configurations in a game of GO. 
 
In formalizing the Go games, it is reasonable to start with smaller sizes and apply them to bigger 
board in the idea of blocking. In spite of the fact that the complexity of a game of GO increases  
exponentially with the board size, human players can reduce the practical complexity drastically 
by decomposing the board configurations and attack them separately. However, the GO board 
can never be partitioned unambiguously, this is where a plausible application of near 
decomposability can be envisaged. Despite all the differences of the two games, there are 
important similarities, too; GO players need to come up with sub-goals, such as Joseki, creating 
Atari, making eyes and escaping from being captured etc., in order to resolve some situations. 
 
4    A Brief Conclusion 
Science, in most of the cases, is built on asking and answering – often unanswerable - questions. 
In order to proceed properly, it is critical in most of the cases, that appropriate questions be 
asked. Decision theory deals with the problems of human choices, and plenty of models have 36 
 
been constructed and examined through the formalizations of orthodox mathematical economics, 
econometrics or experiments.  Nevertheless, behavioral economics emerged based on the failure 
of orthodox economic frameworks. Anomalies have been collected and discovered with respect 
to the normative human behaviors which are predicted by orthodox economics. The central 
doctrines of orthodox economics are optimization subject to constrains and equilibrium analysis. 
Modern behavioral economics emerged as a field of finding and explaining anomalies in human 
decision behavior. The difficulties of solving these problems (optimization and equilibrium) 
have been noticed; however, their solvability has not yet been questioned and challenged in 
Modern Behavioral Economics. 
 
Solvability of problems, by problem solvers, requires formal characterisations of both concepts, 
neither of which has ever been attempted by modern behavioural economists. They are almost 
defined and characterized in classical behavioural economics and computable economics, as we 
have argued above. 
 
Herbert Simon introduced the notion of “bounded rationality” and “satisficing” into economic 
fields along with their psychological and computational underpinnings. Intuitively, 
computability theory tackles the solvability of a problem and computational complexity theory 
measures the difficulty of solving a problem. Thus, if a program is designed to mimic human 
thinking, naturally, the computability of a program has the counterpart in reasoning.  Simon’s 
ideal models of economic agents can be demonstrated by an Information Processing System and 
its nature of adaptation can be captured in the theory of “human problem solving”. Within this 
framework, “anomalies” are, possibly, those that result in uncomputabilities, undecidabilities 
and unsolvabilities of problems, forced into solvable modes by inappropriate models, precisely 
definable as, for example, the use of finite automata where a Turing Machine is required, and so 
on.   
 
If Simon’s postulations are taken into account, then “Olympian” rationality (coined in Simon 
(1983, p.19)) is merely the special case of bounded rationality, and an optimization problem is, 
again, the special case of a satisfiability problem (satisficing), within the formal framework of 
metamathematical decision problems. 
 
Apart from making, hopefully, clear distinctions Modern and Classical Behavioral Economics, a 
more faithful encapsulation of Simon’s notions – with clear computable underpinnings – was 37 
 
presented in this paper. In continuing work, we are expanding the scope Simon’s notions of 
bounded rationality and satisfying, within a formal computable formulation, an exercise already 
begun in Velupillai (2010) to the more general and complex cases of combinatorial game theory. 
Studying, for example, boundedly rational agents, choosing satisfying strategies in a game of Go 
will, we think, form a meaningful milestone in research along this line. 
 
It is even possible to interpret some strands in Simon’s thinking that human beings do try to 
solve the formally unsolvable problems, even while they somehow find ‘only’ the methods 
(heuristics) to satisfactorily solve them. That is to say, they try to make good decisions for only 
the near future, but with long-term targets in mind. No actual agent in his or her right mind (sic!) 
would even dream of formulating infinite horizon optimization problems in the economic sphere, 
except of course those endowed with Olympian notions of rationality, solvability, computability 
and decidability. 
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